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CONSUMER CLASS ACTIONS UNDER THE
UNIFORM DECEPTIVE TRADE
PRACTICES ACT
RICHARD F. DOLE, JR.*
The Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, presently in force
in eight states, makes a private injunctive remedy available to
"persons likely to be damaged" by misleading advertising, false
disparagement, trade symbol infringement and other deceptive
trade practices. This article explores the utility of the Uniform
Act to individual consumers, and to groups of consumers. The
procedural prerequisites of class actions under both the new and
old versions of Rule 23 are considered in detail, and it is con-
cluded that consumer class actions under the Uniform Act can
provide an effective remedy for widespread and systematic con-
sumer protection.
THE WAR on Poverty has focused increasing interest on con-
sumer law-the legal rights, privileges, immunities, powers,
and duties of persons who obtain commercial goods, services, real-
ty, or intangibles.' The National Institute for Education in Law and
Poverty, which serves a continuing legal education function for Office
of Economic Opportunity Neighborhood Legal Services Attorneys,
has, for example, recently published a Handbook on Consumer Ldw,
* Associate Professor, University of Iowa College of Law; LL.B. 1961, LL.M. 1963, Cornell;
S.J.D. 1966, University of Michigan; Consultant, Special Committee on Unfair Competition,
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 1962-65. This article does not
necessarily reflect the views of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws.
The author is presently of counsel in a consumer class action under the Uniform Deceptive
Trade Practices Act: Holstein v. Montgomery Ward & Co., No. 68 CH 275 (Il1. Cir. Ct., Cook
Cty. 1968).
' Consumer law in this sense is the economic aspect of Edmond Cahn's consumer perspective
of law: "Some consumers need bread; others need Shakespeare; others need their rightful place
in the national society-what they all need is processors of law who will consider the people's
needs more significant than administrative convenience." Cahn, Law in the Consumer
Perspective, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 13 (1963).
2 NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR EDUCATION IN LAW AND POVERTY, HANDBOOK ON CONSUMER
LAW (2d ed. 1968). The Neighborhood Legal Services Program was established by the Office
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and several law schools have introduced consumer law courses or
seminars.3 This stress on consumer law by poverty lawyers is readily
understandable. The Kerner Commission disclosed that unfair
consumer sales and credit practices are one of the twelve major
sources of discontent in urban ghettos.4 Moreover, even in that
hopefully not-too-distant future when the War on Poverty is
approaching victory, consumer law problems will remain. Indeed,
the various poverty programs can be viewed primarily as endeavors
to make poor persons more equal consumers.'
An even more recent phenomenon is the use of consumer class
actions or "representative suits"6 by poverty lawyers.7 A class action
is, of course, an action in which certain members of a group with
similar legal claims or defenses represent the entire group in litigation.
Class actions have hitherto served a yeoman function as a tool for
securing civil rights and civil liberties through the desegregation of
school systems,8 the reapportionment of legislatures,9 and the
challenging of welfare eligibility rules.10 The adaptation of class
actions to consumer law issues is attributable in part to the enlistment
of a number of seasoned civil rights litigators in the War on Poverty."
However, the emergence of consumer class actions is fully warranted
by the strategic advantages of such actions.
A class action responds to group injuries involving small amounts
of individual damage by enabling representatives of a class to place
of Economic Opportunity in 1965 in an effort to provide legal services to the poor and to stim-
ulate the poor to engage in community action. The program was inspired by Cahn & Cahn, The
War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective, 73 YALE L.J. 1317 (1964). The National Institute for
Education in Law and Poverty was established in 1967. Note, Beyond the Neighborhood
Office-OEO's Special Grants in Legal Services, 56 GEO. L.J. 742, 764-66 (1968).
3 E.g., CORNELL LAW SCHOOL ANNOUNCEMENT 64 (1968-69); DUKE LAW SCilOOL
BULLETIN 5 (1968); RUTGERS SCHOOL OF LAw-NEWARK ANNOUNCEMENT 23 (1968-69). The
University of Iowa College of Law offers a course in Unfair Competition and Consumer
Protection taught by the author.
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 139-40 (1968).
Viles, The War on Poverty: What Can Lawyers (Being Hunman) Do?, 53 IOwA L. REV. 122,
161-62 (1967).
6 Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY, chs. VI & VII (1950).
'E.g., Russell v. Coburn Corp., No. 6338/68 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Bronx Cty. 1968); Wainwright
v. Young, No. 68 CH 2320 (I11. Cir. Ct., Cook Cty. 1968).
1 E.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 473 (1954).
9 E.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
" E.g., King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
"See. e.g., Russell v. Coburn Corp., No. 6338/68 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Bronx Cty. 1968)
(consumer class action in which the plaintiffs are represented by the NAACP Legal Defense and
Education Fund, Inc.).
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the entire group injury in issue.'2 This escalatory effect of a class
action justifies the expenditure of more time and money by the class
representatives in pressing their claims.'3 It also renders the
claims more likely to receive careful judicial processing. For exam-
ple, a judge will inevitably take more seriously a claim that all of a
particular metropolitan taxicab company's customers have been
overcharged than an overcharge claim by a single customer. 4
Moreover, because of its size, a claim on behalf of a class is far more
likely to meet the jurisdictional requirements of courts of general
jurisdiction.
Another advantage is the economic, psychological, and
procedural pressure which a class action puts on a defendant. 6 The
economic pressure derives both from the legal economies of scale
which accrue to the representatives of a plaintiff-class and from the
potential consequences for a class opponent. The psychological pres-
sure derives from the notoriety that often attaches to a class action.
The visibility, publicity, and public reaction aroused by a class action
can produce results that are as significant as the ultimate outcome
of the action. 7 Finally, the procedural pressure derives from the num-
ber of individual transactions which can be placed in issue by repre-
sentatives of the class, and from the barriers to settling a class ac-
tion. Poverty lawyers have seen some of their best opportunities
to establish consumer-oriented precedents destroyed by well-timed
offers of settlement with the particular consumer-plaintiffs. 5 How-
" Kalven and Rosenfield have described the social significance of the class action device as
follows: "Modern society seems increasingly to expose men to such group injuries for which
individually they are in a poor position to seek legal redress, either because they do not know
enough or because such redress is disproportionately expensive. If each is left to assert his rights
alone if and when he can, there will at best be a random and fragmentary enforcement if there is
any at all. This result is not only unfortunate in the particular case, but it will operate seriously
to impair the deterrent effect of the sanctions which underlie much contemporary law." Kalven
& Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684,
686 (1941).
Note, Parties Plaintiff in Civil Rights Litigation, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 693, 901 (1968).
', See Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967) (In
Bank).
"See PROCEEDINGS OF THE HARVARD CONFERENCE ON LAW AND POVERTY 40-43 (1967).
"Starrs, The Consumer Class Action: Considerations of Equity and Procedure in NATIONAL
INSTITUTE FOR EDUCATION IN LAW AND POVERTY, HANDBOOK ON CONSUMER LAW 109-11 (2d
ed. 1968).
1, Id. at 109.
"S See Note, Neighborhood Law Offices: The New Wave in Legal Services fbr the Poor. 80
HARV. L. REV. 805, 814-15 (1967).
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ever, the complexity of settlement negotiations with multiple
class representatives 9 and the requirement in many jurisdictions
of court approval of any compromise of a class action20 coalesce to
make settlement of class actions an imposing proposition.
In anticipation of the profound influence consumer class actions
will have upon the development of consumer law and poverty law in
general, this article explores the feasibility of such class actions under
the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act. In the opinion of the
author, consumer class actions are both a feasible and a desirable
means of achieving the objectives of the Uniform Act.
AN OUTLINE OF THE UNIFORM DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICEs ACT
The Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act," which is presently
in force in eight states,22 provides a private injunctive remedy to
persons "likely to be damaged" by deceptive trade practices.23 Section
2(a) of the Uniform Act contains both a general condemnation of
deceptive commercial conduct in section 2(a)(12), and a series of
" See Johnson, A Conservative Rationale for the Legal Services Program, 70 W. VA. L. REV,
350, 355-56 (1968).
20 E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 52.1 (Smith-Hurd 1956).
21 The Uniform Act was initially approved by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and
the American Bar Association House of Delegates in 1964. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL
CQNFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 131-32 (1964) [hereinafter cited as
HANDBOOK]; 89 A.B.A. REP. 405 (1964). The Commissioners subsequently revised § 3(b) of the
act, which deals with allowance of costs and attorneys' fees, in response to a resolution by the
ABA Section of Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Law. ABA PATENT, TRADEMARK, AND
COPYRIGHT LAW SECTION 54-56, 64-66 (1965); 1966 HANDBOOK 90; 91 A.B.A. REP. 357
(1966). The current version of the act, which is officially known as the Revised Uniform
Deceptive Trade Practices Act, appears in 1966 HANDBOOK 306-315 [hereinafter the current
version of the act will be cited as UNIFORM ACT]. The original version of the act can be found in
9A UNIFORM LAWS ANN. (Supp. 1967) and S. OPPENHEIM, CASES ON UNFAIR TRADE
PRACTICES 744 (2d ed. 1965).
22 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §9 42-115(c)-(f) (Supp. 1968); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2531-37
(Supp. 1966); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 817.69-.75 (Supp. 1968); GA. CODE ANN. §§ (Supp.
(1968); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 48-601 to 48-606 (Supp. 1967); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 2,
§§ 311-18 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967); N.M. STAT. ANN. "§§ 49-15-1 to 49-15-14 (Supp. 1967);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 78, §§ 51-55 (Supp. 1967). The Connecticut, New Mexico, and
Oklahoma enactments contain deviations from the recommended version of the act. E.g.,
Merill, Oklahoma and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
1965. 36 J. OKLA. B. ASS'N 2205-08 (1965). Commentary on the Uniform Act includes Dole,
Merchant and Consumer Protection: The New York Approach to the Regulation of Deceptive
Trade Practices, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 749 (1968); Dole, The Uniform Deceptive Trade Prac-
tices Act: Another Step Toward a National Law of Unfair Trade Practices, 51 MINN. L.
REV. 1005 (1967); Dole, Merchant and Consumer Protection: The Uniform Deceptive Trade
Practices Act. 76 YALE L.J. 485 (1967).
" UNIFORM ACT § 3(a).
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specific subsections characterizing misleading advertising, false
disparagement, and trade symbol infringement as deceptive trade
practices.2 4 Sections 2(b)25 and 3(a)2 6 amplify section 2(a) with
24 A person engages in a deceptive trade practice when, in the course of his business, vocation,
or occupation, he (1) passes off goods or services as those of another; (2) causes likelihood of
confusion or of misunderstanding as to the source, sponsorship, approval or certification of
goods or services; (3) causes likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to affiliation,
connection, or association with, or certification by another; (4) uses deceptive representations or
designations of geographic origin in connection with goods or services; (5) represents that goods
or services have sponsorship, approval, characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, or quantities
that they do not have or that a person has a sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation, or
connection that he does not have; (6) represents that goods are original or new if they are
deteriorated, altered, reconditioned, reclaimed, used, or second-hand; (7) represents that goods or
services are of a particular standard, quality, or grade, or that goods are of a particular style or
model, if they are of another; (8) disparages the goods, services, or business of another by false
or misleading misrepresentation of fact; (9) advertises goods or services with intent not to sell
them as advertised; (10) advertises goods or services with intent not to supply reasonably
expectable public demand, unless the advertisement discloses a limitation of quantity; (11)
makes false or misleading statements of fact concerning the reasons for, existence of, or amounts
of price reductions; (12) or engages in any other conduct which similarly creates a likelihood of
confusion or of misunderstanding. UNIFORM AcT § 2(a).
Deceptive advertising consists of the dissemination of misleading factual statements
concerning the product, service, or business of the disseminator. See Ely-Norris Safe Co. v.
Mosler Safe Co., 7 F.2d 603, 604 (2d Cir. 1925), rev'd on other grounds, 273 U.S. 132 (1927). In
Lower Main Street Merchants Ass'n v. Paul Geller & Co., 67 N.J. Super. 514, 171 A.2d 21 (Ch.
1961), for instance, competitors were declared to be entitled to an injunction against a
continuous "going out of business" sale conducted by a retail men's clothing store.
False disparagement involves the unprivileged publication of false, injurious statements about
the product, service, or business of another. Prosser, Injurious Falsehood: The Basis of Liability,
59 COLUM. L. REV. 425 (1959). False disparagement is also known as injurious falsehood,
slander of goods, and trade libel. Id. Thus, in H.E. Allen Mfg. Co. v. Smith, 224 App. Div. 187,
229 N.Y.S. 692 (1928), a New York appellate court approved an injunction against the
distribution of spurious United States Department of Agriculture documents that falsely
indicated that the plaintiff's fly spray had been condemned by the government. False state-
ments that impugn the integrity of credit of a business also constitute actionable defamation.
See Marlin Fire Arms Co. v. Shields, 171 N.Y. 384, 390, 64 N.E. 163, 164 (1902).
Trade symbol infringement is the use of a commercial identification by one businessman that
purchasers are likely to confuse with the commercial identification previously used by another.
R. DOLE, TERRITORIAL TRADEMARK RIGHTS AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS 4-11 (Michigan Legal
Publications 1965). For example, in Standard Oil Co. of New York v. Standard Oil Co. of
Maine, 38 F.2d 677 (D. Me.), modified on other grounds, 45 F.2d 309 (1st Cir. 1930), the long-
established Standard Oil Company of New York was held entitled to enjoin the use of the
"Standard Oil Company" by a newly-organized corporation that was engaged in the
distribution of petroleum products in northern New England.
25 UNIFORM ACT § 2(b) provides: "In order to prevail in an action under this act, a
complainant need not prove competition between the parties or actual confusion or
misunderstanding."
26 Id. § 3(a) states: "A person likely to be damaged by a deceptive trade practice of another
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declarations that neither competition between the parties, actual
confusion or misunderstanding, intent to deceive, nor provable
monetary damage need be established to obtain relief. These sections
do not preclude use of such factors as evidence of probable damage,
but make clear that other evidence will also suffice. A wholesaler with
an exclusive sales agency for a trademarked beverage, for example,
may be damaged by repeated false assertions that the beverage is
mislabeled, even though the retailer who makes the claims is honestly
mistaken about their truth." In addition to authorizing injunctive
relief against deceptive trade practices, 9 the Uniform Act preserves
other state remedies that are not expressly superceded by the Uniform
Act29 and gives discretion to the court to award attorneys' fees to the
prevailing party if a complainant has brought an action known to be
groundless or if a defendant has deliberately engaged in a deceptive
trade practice.3 0
CONSUMER STANDING UNDER THE UNIFORM DECEPTIVE TRADE
PRACTICES ACT
The Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act confers standing on
any "person likely to be damaged by a deceptive trade practice of
another . . . ."I "Person" is defined as "an individual, corporation,
government, or governmental subdivision or agency, business trust,
estate, trust, partnership, unincorporated association, two or more of
may be granted an injunction against it under the principles of equity and on terms that the court
considers reasonable. Proof of monetary damage, loss of profits or intent to deceive is not
required ....
2, Cf. Joseph E. Seagram and Sons v. Restaurant Cherry Lane, Inc., 118 U.S.P.Q. 41 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1958).
2 UNIFORM ACT § 3(a). See note 26 supra. For discussion of the reasons for omitting a
damage remedy from the Uniform Act, see Dole, supra note 22, 51 MINN. L. REv. at 1017-18.
29 UNIFORM AT § 3(c). Section 2(c) coordinately provides: "This section does not affect
unfair trade practices otherwise actionable at common law or under other statutes of this state."
" Id. § 3(b). With a caveat that attorneys' fees could be assessed against a defendant only if
the court found that he had willfully engaged in a deceptive trade practice, the original version of
the Uniform Act authorized a court to award attorneys' fees to the prevailing party "in
exceptional cases." 9A UNIFORM LAWS ANN. (Supp. 1967, at 17). In states where the original
Uniform Act has been enacted, the "uniform interpretation" clause in § 5 should lead judges to
interpret original § 3(b) in light of the 1966 amendment until conforming amendments are
made. For example, a strike suit under the Uniform Act would constitute an "exceptional
circumstance" justifying the award of attorneys' fees to the defendant under the original wording
of § 3(b). The 1966 amendment, of course, expressly singles out this situation as an instance in
which attorneys' fees can be recovered.
" UNIFORMt AcT § 3(a).
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any of the foregoing having a joint or common interest or any other
legal or commercial entity. 32 On first reading, there would seem
to be little doubt that a consumer would qualify as "a person
likely to be damaged." However, there are several possible
objections to this interpretation: (1) The Uniform Act originated as
an effort to reform the law of business torts, not consumer torts;33 (2)
the limitation of relief under the Uniform Act to an injunction can be
considered to be more compatible with business than with consumer
interests since an individual businessman is more apt to be damaged
on a continuing basis by sustained deceptive trade practices than an
individual consumer;3" and (3) it is at least superficially difficult to
comprehend how consumers could effectively utilize the Uniform
Act. A consumer who has discovered a deceptive trade practice
should not need an injunction to protect himself from the deceptive
trade practice in the future, and a consumer who has not discovered
a deceptive trade practice cannot be aware that the Uniform Act has
been violated.35
None of these possible objections to consumer standing outweighs
the plain words of the statute which confer standing on any "person
likely to be damaged." It is the likelihood of future damage from a
deceptive trade practice which is the essential element of standing, not
the economic level at which a plaintiff functions. Although the
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws initiated the study which led
to the promulgation of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act at the
request of the American Bar Association Section of Patent; Trade-
mark, and Copyright Law, a business-oriented group,36 the Commis-
sioners almost immediately perceived the utility of allowing both
business and consumer suits against deceptive trade practices.
In 1962 the Special Committee charged with formulation of the
Uniform Act presented two alternative substantive provisions for
consideration by the National Conference sitting as a Committee of
Id. § 1(5).
" Starrs, supra note 16, at 106.
I4 d.
" Dole, supra note 22, 76 YALE L.J. at 500. A typical example would be the apparent
offering of prestige items at bargain prices by a competitor who is in reality engaging in flagrant
deceptive advertising. Cf. American Washboard Co. v. Saginaw Mfg. Co., 103 F. 281 (6th Cir.
1900).
"ABA PATENT, TRADEMARK, AND COPYRIGHT LAW SECTION 45 (1958); 1959 HANDBOOK 66-
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the Whole. Following an extended discussion in which various
opinions concerning consumer standing were aired,37 the Committee
of the Whole declined to express a preference on the issue of consumer
standing and left the matter in the hands of the Special Committee. 8
Shortly after this decision was reached, Commissioner Wade of
Tennessee, a member of the Special Committee which drafted the act,
pinpointed the language of the draft which gave a consumer standing.
Line 4 of section 2 of the 1962 draft authorized relief "upon the suit of
one damaged or likely to be damaged thereby. . . . Commissioner
Wade stated: "As to line 4, it would very definitely, I think, indicate
that the consumer does have a cause of action, so that when the
decision is made on that, some reference should be made to line 4 in
this connection. 4C
Commissioner Wade's comments were the last significant
reference to the consumer standing issue on the floor of the National
Conference during the formulation of the Uniform Act. Thus, the
similarity of the test for standing in the promulgated act to the test for
standing in the 1962 draft makes clear that the promulgated act
carries forward the grant of consumer standing which Commissioner
Wade perceived in the 1962 draft.4' The 1962 Proceedings in the
Committee of the Whole also make clear that the Committee of the
Whole left this issue to be resolved by the Special Committee. No
serious challenges were subsequently raised to the manner in which the
issue was resolved. 42 Although the proceedings of the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws are not
37 Proceedings in Committee of the Whole of the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, August 4, 1962 at 11-35 [hereinafter cited as 1962 Proceedings]. Early in
the discussion Commissioner G.M. Fuller of Oklahoma, the Chairman of the Special
Committee in charge of the act, was asked the following question: "Mr. Kohn: The next
question is: Is it intended that a consumer be allowed to sue as well as a competitor? Mr. Fuller:
Yes. It is possible that that could occur, and it is intended to be for the protection of both the
businessman and the consumer." Id. at 10.
31 Id. at 35-44.
11 Id. at 45.
,0 Id. at 47.
"The absence in the promulgated act of language conferring standing on a person "damaged"
merely reflects the decision to omit a damage remedy from the final version of the act. A person
who has been damaged does not require injunctive relief unless he is also likely to continue to be
damaged. Proceedings in Committeee of the Whole of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, August. 4, 1964 at 102-03 [hereinafter cited as 1964
Proceedings].
"At one point the author questioned whether consumers could satisfy the "likelihood of
damage" test for standing, but he was flatly rebuffed by Commissioner Jestrab and the issue was
dropped. 1964 Proceedings at 14-19.
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conclusive respecting the meaning to be given individual state enact-
ments, the proceedings suggest highly persuasive interpretations of
language that has been adopted in the same form proposed by the
National Conference. The proceedings thus furnish strong support for
allowing consumer suits under the Uniform Act.
The Official Prefatory Note to the Uniform Act provides
additional confirmation of consumer standing. California Civil Code
section 336911 is described as "a rough prototype" of the Uniform
Act," and adjudications under section 3369 are said to reflect
principles crystallized in the uniform statute.45 One of the California
cases cited in the Official Prefatory Note, People v. National
Research Co.,4 6 determined that the essential test of unfair or
fraudulent business practice under section 3369 was a likelihood of
public deception. In reaching this conclusion the California court
rejected the argument that the public deception must occur in the
course of business competition, reasoning that the broad language of
the statute indicated a legislative intent to be inclusive rather than
restrictive concerning the practices to be enjoined.47 National Re-
search was a section 3369 suit by the California Attorney General
against an organization which sold bogus governmental forms to per-
sons seeking to locate delinquent debtors.48 Nonetheless, its inclusive
" The California statute provides in part: "2. Any person performing or proposing to perform
an act of unfair competition within this State may be enjoined in any court of competent
jurisdiction. 3. As used in this section, unfair competition shall mean and include unlawful,
unfair or fraudulent business practices and unfair, untrue or misleading advertising and any act
denounced by Business and Professions Sections 17500-17535, inclusive." CAL. CIv. CODE
§ 3369 (West Supp. 1967).
"1966 HANDBOOK at 300.
"IT]he statute does not contain a restrictive or exclusive definition of unfair competition,
Athens Lodge No. 70 v. Wilson, 117 Cal. App. 2d 322, 255 P.2d 482 (1953); what constitutes an
unfair or fraudulent business practice under its terms is a question of fact with the essential test
being likelihood of public deception, People v. National Research Co., 201 Cal. App. 2d 765, 20
Cal. Rptr. 516 (1962)." 1966 HANDBOOK at 301.
46201 Cal. App. 2d 765, 20 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1962).
"We conclude that the equitable relief authorized by Civil Code, section 3369, is not
circumscribed by any prerequisite showing that the conduct in question be limited to the field of
business competition.
"The very breadth of the terms used by the Legislature indicate, in our judgment, an intent to
be inclusive rather than restrictive in the practices to be enjoined. We refrain from construing the
language narrowly in a field where the trend is opposed to unfair trade practices which affect the
public interest." People v. National Research Co., 201 Cal. App. 2d 765, 771, 20 Cal. Rptr. 516,
520 (1962).
" Unlike the Uniform Act, § 3369 expressly grants standing to the state attorney general.
Compare UNIFORM AcT § 3(a) with CAL. CiV. CODE § 3369(5) (West 1964).
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construction of the scope of section 3369 supports interpretation of
the Uniform Act to encompass consumer as well as business torts.49
This interpretation is further supported by the purpose of' the
Uniform Act as stated in the Official Prefatory Note: to remove
common law restrictions and provide a private injunctive remedy to
those persons likely to be damaged by deceptive trade practices."
Thus, the objectives of the Act are phrased in the broadest possible
terms; and the language concerning standing, which Commissioner
Wade believes is sufficient to create consumer standing, is stressed.
This is a natural consequence of Commissioner Fuller's observation
during the 1962 Committee of the Whole proceedings that consumers
are as likely to be damaged by deceptive trade practices as business-
men.
51
The Uniform Act's provision for equitable relief is not
inconsistent with consumer standing to sue. Equitable relief against
deceptive trade practices can be of benefit to all consumers who desire
to maintain a commercial relationship with a merchant who has
demonstrated a penchant for deceptive trade practices. A court order
to refrain from specific deceptive conduct with respect to consumers
or face penalties for contempt of court is a persuasive inducement to
cease misleading one's clientele. 2
0' Section 3369 expressly confers standing on "any person acting for the interest of itself, its
members or the general public." CAL. CIV. CODE § 3369(5) (West 1964). By dispensing with
injury as a prerequisite for standing, § 3369 thus allows "private attorneys general" to enjoin
deceptive trade practices. Dole, supra note 22, 76 YALE L.J. at 498-99. On the other hand, the
Uniform Act does not eliminate reference to potential damages in determining the issue of
standing. UNIFOR. AcT § 3(a).
This distinction between § 3369 and the Uniform Act by no means precludes consumer
standing under the latter. The distinction simply means that a consumer must establish a
likelihood of damage from a deceptive trade practice before he can sue under the Uniform Act.
10 1966 HANDBOOK at 299. The Prefatory Note further states:
"The Uniform Act is designed to bring state law up to date by removing undue restrictions on
the common law action for deceptive trade practices. Certain objectionable practices are singled
out, but the courts are left free to fix the proper ambit of the act in case by case adjudication.
"The Uniform Act provides a private conjunctive [sic] remedy to persons likely to suffer
pecuniary harm for [sic] conduct involving either misleading identification of business or goods
or false or deceptive advertising."
3, 1962 Proceedings at 26-27. (Commissioner Fuller also noted that consumers would be less
likely to sue than businessmen). In point of fact, consumers are in all probability even more
likely to be damaged than businessmen. Consumers may not be able to identify deceptive
techniques as readily as businessmen and cannot, as businessmen can, minimize their injury by a
parallel adoption of deceptive practices. See Comment, Translating Sympathy for Deceived
Consumers into Effective Programs for Protection, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 395-97 (1966).
': In addition to criminal penalties, violation of an injunction can result in civil liability to
consumers damaged by the violation. Starrs, supra note 16, at 90-91.
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From a consumer standpoint, the principal defect of the in-
junctive remedy of the Uniform Act is not its usefulness but its
expense. The Uniform Act does not authorize the recovery of
damages from which the cost of litigation can be recouped. However,
the attorneys' fees provision of the Uniform Act compensates for this.
The act permits the award of attorneys' fees to a successful plaintiff
where the defendant is found to have willfully engaged in a deceptive
trade practice, 3 and, as in civil rights litigation, the courts should take
due note of the social value of proceedings under the Uniform Act in
making such awards. In Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc.,54 a
recent class action to enjoin racial discrimination in public
accommodations, the successful plaintiffs sought to recover a
reasonablp attorney's fee under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which
permits such awards to the prevailing party in the court's discretion.55
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that an attorney's fee
should only be recoverable where the defendant had introduced bad
faith defenses for the purpose of delay." The Supreme Court,
however, modified the decision per curiam, reasoning that when a
plaintiff brings an action for injunctive relief under the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, he aids not only himself, but all other persons subject to
the same discrimination. The Court concluded that without recovery
of attorney's fees, few aggrieved persons would be able to maintain
such actions, and the policies which Congress sought to effectuate
through the Civil Rights Act would be deprived of the private
injunction as a viable means of enforcement. 7
The Newman case suggests an additional reason to believe that
consumers will take advantage of the opportunity to obtain an
injunction that is priovided by the Uniform Act. The NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., appeared for the plaintiffs in
Newman, and this organization, and others like it, are evincing an
increasing interest in financing consumer litigation.58
" UNIFORM ACT § 3(b).
"4 377 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1967), modified, 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam).
1 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1964).
16 377 F.2d at 433.
"1 390 U.S. at 402. See generally Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great
Society, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 792 (1966).
" See Schrag, Ghetto Merchants-A Study in Deception, 159 NEW REPUBLIC 17 (1968)
(article by a consumer test case counsel for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund,
Inc.). In Russell v. Coburn Corp., No. 6338/68 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Bronx Cty. 1968), a consumer
class action brought under the New York Personal Property Law, the NAACP Legal Defense
and Education Fund has offered either to accept an award of attorneys' fees which would be
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Office of Economic Opportunity Neighborhood Legal Services
Attorneys can also utilize the Uniform Act. Although Neighborhood
Legal Services Attorneys can only represent indigent clients and must
refer "fee-generating" cases to private attorneys, 9 private attorneys
may not regularly accept referrals of Uniform Act cases. A court has
full discretion to deny the recovery of fees in situations in which the
Uniform Act permits their award,6" a circumstance which may lessen
private attorneys' interest in such referrals. As long as a potential
plaintiff is indigent and no private attorney cares to gamble on the
court's exercise of its discretion, Legal Services Attorneys can take
cases arising under the Uniform Act.61
Resolution of the problem of litigation expense removes only one
obstacle to consumer actions under the Uniform Act. Another
problem, perhaps the most serious objection to consumer standing, is
the difficulty of relating consumer suits to the "likely to be damaged"
test of section 3(a).62 Only a person "likely to be damaged" can sue for
injunctive relief under the act; yet why should a consumer who knows
that a merchant is engaging in trickery need an injunction to protect
himself in the future? On the other hand, how can consumers who are
likely to be damaged in the future because they do not know about the
trickery ever realize that they have standing to sue? Indeed, will not
their discovery of the trickery, which will alert them to the possibility
of suit under the Uniform Act, ipso facto destroy their standing by
removing any likelihood of future injury?63
As long as a consumer desires to have a continued relationship
used to finance future consumer litigation or to waive attorneys' fees altogether. Plaintiff's
Memorandum of Law in Opposition to a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, Russell v. Coburn
Corp., supra, at 60-62. Volunteer attorneys provide another source of counsel. Shamberg, The
Utilization of Volunteer Attorneys to Provide Effective Legal Services for the Poor, 63 Nw,
U.L. REV. 159 (1968). Nevertheless, the need is great and the cost of representation high.
Schrag, supra, calls for legislation which would permit consumers to recover reasonable
attorneys' fees from deceptive-practice-prone merchants.
" Johnson, An Analysis of the OEO LegalServices Program, 38 Miss. L.J. 419,426 (1967).
" UNIFORM ACT § 3(b); Dole, supra note 22, 76 YALE L.J. at 495.
6See OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY, LEGAL SERVICES GUIDELINES 20-21; Note,
Neighborhood Law Offices: The New Wave in Legal Services for the Poor, 80 HARV. L. REV.
805, 846-47 (1967).
62 UNIFORM ACT § 3(a).
" These questions were discussed briefly during the 1964 Proceedings of the Committee of the
Whole. The author and Commissioner Jestrab engaged in a colloquy which ended as follows:
"Mr. Dole: I am suggesting to you . . . that a customer . . . would have no standing to sue
under this Act once he were aware of the deception. Mr. Jestrab: I don't think that's right. I
don't think that's true at all." 1964 Proceedings at 19. Commissioner Jestrab apparently had the
1962 proceedings more clearly in mind than the author at this juncture.
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with a merchant whom he has observed in a deceptive trade practice
which is not transparent once discovered, there can be a likelihood
that the consumer will be damaged by repetition of similar deceptive
trade practices. It is no answer to say that the consumer can protect
himself by dealing with someone else. Many consumers rely heavily
on neighborhood merchants and there may not be satisfactory
alternative sources of supply in the neighborhood. 6 However, even
where alternative sources of supply are available, a consumer who
chooses to deal with a perceived deceptor can still qualify for relief as
long as repetition of the deception will be difficult to detect and there
is a probability that the deception will be repeated. Thus, a consumer
who wishes to deal with a merchant who has been known to engage in
such opaque deceptive trade practices as price misrepresentation,
substitution of different goods from those ordered, or bait
advertising, 6 each of which is specifically proscribed by the Uniform
Act, 66 can enjoin future violations of the Uniform Act where the
nature of the past violations raises a probability of additional
violations. A consumer's interest in dealing with the merchant of his
choice is entitled to greater weight than a merchant's desire to avoid
equitable relief against deceptive trade practices.
Of course, a merchant is also privileged to select the persons with
whom he chooses to deal.67 A merchant, however, cannot necessarily
moot a suit under the Uniform Act by ceasing to do business with the
consumer seeking injunctive relief. Where the cessation of business is
intended primarily to deprive the consumer-plaintiff of standing, a
court can either disregard the cessation of business or utilize its equity
powers to preserve its jurisdiction at least until the pending litigation
has been adjudicated.68 Indeed, it can be plausibly maintained that
6 This is especially true of the urban poor. See D. CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE, chs. 4 &
5 (1967).
65 These types of deception are common in urban areas. Id. at 142-53. Bait advertising is
the advertising of a bargain which one does not intend to sell in order to attract customers who
can be switched to a higher-priced, unadvertised item. ld-at 142-44.
"A person engages in a deceptive trade practice when, in the course of his business, vocation,
or occupation, he: (1) passes off goods or services as those of another; . . . (9) advertises goods
or services with intent not to sell them as advertised; (10) advertises goods or services with intent
not to supply reasonably expectable public demand, unless the advertisement discloses a
limitation of quantity; (I1) makes false or misleading statements of.fact concerning the reasons
for, existence of, or amounts of price reductions." UNIFORM AcT .§§ 2(a)(l), (9), (10), & (II).
67 Cf United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
6SCf. Bergan Drug Co. v. Parke, Davis & Co., 307 F.2d 725 (3d Cir. 1962); Flynn, A Survey
of Injunctive Relief Under State and Federal Antitrust Laws, 1967 UTAH L. REV. 344, 375.
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such a calculated refusal to deal would be a violation of section
2(a)(12) of the Uniform Act which would warrant both an injunction
and an award of attorneys' fees to the consumer-plaintiff. Section
2(a)(12) forbids "conduct which similarly creates a likelihood of
confusion or of misunderstanding,' 69 and a refusal to deal that was
designed to preclude injunctive relief against specific violations of the
Uniform Act would seem to be conduct falling within its terms. On
the other hand, where a merchant has reasons for breaking relations
with a consumer-plaintiff that are unrelated to the pending law suit-
for example, the consumer's failure to make stipulated monthly
payments-the merchant's refusal to continue to deal with the
consumer-plaintiff will ordinarily moot a suit under the Uniform Act
by legitimately removing any likelihood of future damage to the
individual consumer-plaintiff. Nevertheless, in the case of a consumer
class action, this will merely require a reshuffling of class
representatives and will not moot the proceeding with respect to those
members of the class with whom the merchant continues to deal.
The standing of individual consumers to sue is the predicate of
consumer class actions under the Uniform Act. There appears to be
no reason why a group of individual consumers with standing cannot
utilize the efficient class action device as a surrogate for individual
actions. Indeed, the Uniform Act invites the use of class actions by
defining "person" to include "an individual, corporation, government
or governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust,
partnership, unincorporated association, two or more of any of the
foregoing having a joint or common interest, or any other legal or
commercial entity."7 A group with a joint or common interest is, of
course, precisely the kind of group which can bring a class action7
so that the definition of "person" implies that class actions are per-
missible under the Uniform Act. This view is also buttressed by the
purpose of the act. The maintenance of class actions will facilitate
the goal of providing a private injunctive remedy to all persons likely
to suffer pecuniary harm from deceptive trade practices.7 2
A consumer class action involves a number of procedural niceties.
69 UNIFORM ACT § 2(a)(12). The Official Comment to § 2(a)(12) states that the subsection
"permits the courts to block out new kinds of deceptive trade practices." 1966 HANDBOOK at
310. However, this does not preclude application of the subsection to conduct which results in
perpetuation of recognized deceptive trade practices.
7UNIFORMt AT § 1(5) (emphasis added).
E.g.. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) & (b); Z. CHAFEE, SOM1E PROBLESIS OF EQUITY 213-24 (1950).
72 1966 HANDBOOK at 299; cf Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968),
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However, before considering the mechanics of class actions, it
should be pointed out that even the existence of individual consumer
standing to sue raises joinder problems under the Uniform Act. It will
be recalled that the deceptive trade practices singled out by the act can
be subdivided into trade symbol infringement," false disparagement, 74
and deceptive advertising." These deceptive trade practices vary in
their impact on consumers and businessmen. Trade symbols are
extremely valuable property, 76 and a trade symbol user can be
seriously injured by any concurrent rights to his trade symbol
acquired by other businessmen. 77 For those reasons, joinder of the
lawful user of the trade symbol in question should be considered
indispensable in any consumer suit under the Uniform Act which
involves trade symbol infringement. The interests of the lawful trade
symbol user cannot ordinarily be adequately protected in any other
way and consumer interests will generally be advanced by the lawful
trade symbol user with or without a consumer suit.7s The volume of
business-initiated litigation involving trade symbol infringement is
immense.79
False disparagement also involves significant interests of a third
party, the business which is the target of the disparagement. This
business has an understandable concern in having the truth or falsity
of the charges against it properly litigated. The target business also is
often in the best position to supply information concerning the truth
71 UNIFORM ACT §§ 2(a)(l), (2) & (3).
" Id. at § 2(a)(8).
" Id. at §§ 2(a)(4), (5), (6), (7), (9), (10) & (I I).
76 In 1963, for example, Polaroid Corporation adduced evidence that it had sold over 450
million dollars worth of "Polaroid" products and had spent approximately 30 million dollars in
advertising products identified by the trade symbol. Polaroid Corp. v. Polaraid, Inc., 319 F.2d
830, 832 (7th Cir. 1963).
" See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90 (1918); Hanover Star Milling
Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916); R. DOLE, TERRITORIAL TRADEMARK RIGHTS AND THE
ANTITRUST LAWs 24-30 (Michigan Legal Publications 1965).
S See FED. R. Civ. P. 19; F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 413 (1965). New Rule 19 requires a
court to weigh the following factors in deciding if a party's presence is indispensible to a lawsuit:
whether a judgment rendered in the party's absence might be prejudicial to him; whether
prejudice can be avoided by protective provisions; whether a judgment rendered in the person's
absence will be adequate; and whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is
dismissed for non-joinder. FED. R. CIv. P. 19(b). Professor James indicates that similar fact-
tors were weighed under the former federal rule and in variou.sstates. F. JAM1ES, supra at 414-
28.
7 See Derenberg, The Twentieth Year of Adininisiration of the Lanham Trademark Act of
1946, 57 TRADEMARK REP. 643 (1967); Derenberg, The Nineteenth Year of Adninistration of
the Lanhant Trademark Act of 1946, 56 TRADEMARK REP. 691 (1966).
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or falsity of the statements. On the other hand, a consumer-plaintiff
may well have sources of information and representation adequate to
protect the target business' interests. These considerations suggest
that the target of false disparagement should ordinarily be made a
party to a consumer suit where joinder is possible but that the suit
should be allowed to proceed wherejoinder cannot be achieved."
Deceptive advertising differs from trade symbol infringement and
false disparagement in that deceptive advertising generally has greater
adverse impact on consumers than on any specific business.
Consumers may or may not be injured by trade symbol infringement
or false disparagement. Neither of these torts necessarily involves
misrepresentation of what is being offered for sale by the tortfeasor.
In contrast, the essence of deceptive advertising is the
misrepresentation of what is offered for sale.' It is also difficult to
pinpoint particular businessmen who are uniquely injured by
deceptive advertising. All of a deceptive advertiser's competitors and
their suppliers are usually affected. Thus, a consumer suit against
deceptive advertising typically poses no additional joinder problems
because consumers have a definable and distinct interest in the
suppression of deceptive advertising which is unlikely to trench deeply
upon the interests of any particular legitimate business.
PROCEDURAL NUANCES OF CONSUMER CLASS ACTIONS
State class action procedure is regulated by various court rules
and statutes." Because an increasing number of states have opted to
follow a federal model, some of the procedural aspects of consumer
class actions will be analyzed in terms of both the new Federal Rule
23, which became effective in 1966,83 and the former Rule 23 which
was implemented in 1938.11 The principal difference between them re-
5
oSee FED. R. Civ. P. 19; F. JAMES, supra note 78, at 413-28.
SI E.g., People v. Abbott Maintenance Corp., I I App. Div. 2d 136, 201 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1960)
(per curiam), affd mene., 9 N.Y.2d 810, 175 N.E.2d 341, 215 N.Y.S.2d 761 (1961). See note
2 4 supra.
" Starrs, The Consumer Class Action: Considerations of Equity and Procedure in NATIONAL
INSTITUTE FOR EDUCATION IN LAW AND POVERTY, HANDBOOK ON CONSUMER LAW 116-17 (2d
ed. 1968).
.3 39 F.R.D. 69, 95-107 (1966).
" FED. R. CIv. P. 86(a). Former Rule 23 has been adopted in numerous states. 3A J. MOORE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.03 at 3417 n. 7 (2d ed. 1968); see, e.g., Braasch v. Goldschmidt, 41
Del. Ch. 519, 199 A.2d 760 (1964). New Rule 23 has already been adopted in Arizona and
Minnesota and proposed for adoption in New Jersey. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. Rule 23 (Supp.
1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. District Ct. Rule 23 (Supp. 1968); Conover v. Packanack Lake
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lates to the contemplated scope of the judgment in a class action. Un-
der new Rule 23 the judgment, whether or not favorable to the class,
ordinarily extends to all the members of the class."s Under former
Rule 23 the judgment in some class actions only extended to members
of the class who had become parties to the action through joinder or
intervention.16 This distinction between new and former Rule 23 is
essentially a difference in the probable res judicata effect of a
judgment on the members of a class. Although new Rule 23 does not
alter the established principle that the court which adjudicates an
action cannot simultaneously determine the res judicata effect of its
own judgment, 7 the broader terms of the judgments authorized by
new Rule 23 should induce a corresponding expansion in res judicata
effect. 8
NEW RULE 23
New Rule 23(a) establishes four general prerequisites to the
maintenance of a class action. It must appear (1) that the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) that there
are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) that the claims or
defenses of the class representatives are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class; and (4) that the class representatives will fairly
and adequately protect the interests of the class.89
Aside from specifying the general criterion that a group must be
too large to be practicably joined, new Rule 23 does not indicate how
large a group must be in order to justify class action treatment."
Accordingly, the federal courts have exercised wide discretion in
deciding whether a proposed class is of sufficient size.9 A group of
forty has been considered sufficient under former Rule 23.92 It has also
Country Club & Community Ass'n., 94 N.J. Super. 275, 279 n.l, 228 A.2d 78,80 n.-l (App. Div.
1967). Furthermore, federal courts' interpretations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have
been known to influence state courts in the application of state rules whih were not derived from
federal models. E.g., Verdin v. Thomas, 191 So. 2d 646, 650-51 (La. Aji 1966).
" See generally Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 390-93 (1968). Persons who opt out
of a (b)(3) class action are excepted. See notes 125-27 infra and accompanying text.
6 Kaplan, supra note 85, at 376-86.
" 39 F.R.D. 69, 106 (1966) (Advisory Committee's Note to new Rule 23(c)(3)).
"I 2 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 572 (C. Wright
Rev. Ed. Supp. 1967).
', FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(l)-(4).
Iod. 23(a)(1).
Demarco v. Edens, 390 F.2d 936, 845 (2d Cir. 1968); Cypress v. Newport News Gen. &
Nonsectarian Hosp. Ass'n, 375 F.2d 648, 653 (4th Cir. 1967).
11 Citizens' Banking Co. v. Monticello State Bank, 143 F.2d 261, 264 (8th Cir. 1944).
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been held that, as long as the group involved is well-defined and
obviously substantial, a plaintiff does not have to specify the precise
number of persons in the group in order to bring a class action.91
There are frequently enough consumers affected by the same deceptive
trade practice to permit class action treatment. This is true, for
example, where a deceptive advertisement is disseminated by means of
mass media,94 and where substantially similar deceptive statements
are repetitively used in door-to-door or in-store selling."
Not only the size and composition of the class, but also the nature
of the claim presented by that class must be scrutinized under Rule 23.
There is an obvious relationship between the requirement that there be
questions of law or fact common to the class96 and the requirement
that the claims of the class representatives must be typical of the
class. 7 These requirements mean that substantially the same
deception must have been practiced on the entire group of consumers
that are asserted to constitute a class, including the class
representatives. The requirement that the class representatives have
claims that are typical of the class" is also related to the requirement
that they must fairly and adequately represent the class.'0 c The
justification seems to be that a person will fight harder for that which
affects him directly.'"' Again, a substantial similarity in the nature of
9' Jacobs v. Paul Hardeman, Inc., 42 F.R.D. 595, 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Fischer v. Kletz, 41
F.R.D. 377, 383-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
9See, e.g., People v. Glubo, 5 N.Y.2d 461, 158 N.E.2d 699, 186 N.Y.S.2d 26 (1959) (case
shows the large number of consumers who can be affected by fraudulent advertising and sales
practices).
11 E.g., People v. Abbott Maintenance Corp., I I App. Div. 2d 136, 201 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1960)
(per curiam), affd men., 9 N.Y.2d 810, 175 N.E.2d 341, 215 N.Y.S.2d 761 (1961) (in-store
selling); Lefkowitz v. ITM, Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (door-to-
door selling).
96 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).
9Id. 23 (a) (3).
9 Cf. Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 683 (N.D. III. 1966);
Kronenberg v. Hotel Governor Clinton, Inc., 41 F.R.D. 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). A leading New
York case details a standardized bait advertising scheme which was honed to perfection by a
series of instruction sessions or clinics for the bait advertiser's salesmen. People v. Glubo, 5
N.Y.2d 461, 158 N.E.2d 699, 186 N.Y.S.2d 26 (1959); accord, Robnet v. Miller, 105 Ohio App.
536, 152 N.E.2d 763 (1957). Bait advertising, of course, occurs where a seller seeks to attract
customers by advertising at a low price an item that he does not intend to sell in more than
nominal amounts. The seller then uses various artifices in order to switch persons who respond
to his advertisements to unadvertised, higher-priced merchandise. See Note, State Control of
Bait Advertising, 69 YALE L.J. 830, 832 (1960).
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3).
Id. 23(a)(4).
"' See Jacobs v. Paul Hardeman, Inc., 42 F.R.D. 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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the deception practiced on a group of consumers will help to satisfy
this requirement .102
The Second Circuit in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin'3 recently
declared that the notion of adequate representation also required the
class representatives to provide counsel "qualified, experienced and
generally able to conduct the proposed litigation."''0' Concerned with
the prospect of a collusive suit, the court further demanded assurance
that the interests of the class representatives were not adverse to those
of the other members of the class. On the other hand, the Second
Circuit dismissed consideration of quantitative representation, the
number of persons appearing as class representatives in comparison
with the total number in the class, as a determinant of the adequacy of
representation. The court stated: "If we have to rely on one litigant to
assert the rights of a large class then rely we must." 115
The Eisen concept of adequate representation is a landmark
interpretation of new Rule 2 3 16 which greatly facilitates consumer
class actions. Quantitative representation, considered important
under the former rule, 10 presents a substantial obstacle to consumer
class actions where the individual stakes are small. In this situation,
the consumer class may be fortunate to ind a single representative
who will tight for principle.'"
After satisfying the general prerequisites discussed above, a class
action must meet at least one of several additional requirements
specified in section b of new Rule 23. New Rule 23(b)(1) authorizes a
class action where individual litigation between members of a class
and its opponent could result in the establishment of incompatible
standards of conduct for the opponent, ' and where adjudications
with respect to individual members of a class would, as a practical
matter, be dispositive of the interests of the other members of the
class.' I
"0 See authorities cited in note 98 supra.
Wo' 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968).
1 4d. at 562.
101 Id. at 563.
"I The Eisen view has already been followed. Hohmann v. Packard Instrument Co., 399 F.2d
711 (7th Cir. 1968); Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559 (D. Minn. 1968).
'" E.g., Pelelas v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 113 F.2d 629 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 700
(1950).
lesSee Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967) (In
Bank).





There are several reasons why it is highly unlikely that individual
consumer suits under the Uniform Act would establish incompatible
standards for a merchant's conduct. In the first place, although the
details of successive injunctions against deceptive trade practices
could differ, there would be a natural tendency for later decrees to be
influenced by the terms of the first decree." Moreover, once one
consumer has succeeded in enjoining particular conduct, a merchant
may well have to revise his marketing methods with respect to all of
his clientele. This eventuality would make it improbable that duplica-
tive suits would be filed.
On the other hand, these very reasons can be considered to justify
a (b)(1) class action on the alternative rationale that an individual
injunctive suit would be practically dispositive of the interests of the
consumer class."12 This rationale is most pertinent where one of
several persons is pressing a claim against a limited fund; however, the
Advisory Committee's Notes to new Rule 23 make clear that an
individual suit for injunctive relief which affects a defendant's
capacity to deal. with other members of a group also is sufficient."'
Insofar as a consumer class action under the Uniform Act is
concerned, the argument would be that a (b)(l) class action is justified
by the probability that the first individual suit would discourage
similar suits by other consumers, and by the probability that any
subsequent decrees would mirror the decree obtained in the first
individual action.
New Rule 23(b)(2) authorizes a class action wherever "the party
opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally
applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive
relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a
"'See, e.g., People v. National Research Co., 201 Cal. App. 2d 765, 20 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1962).
112 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(I)(B).
'""Similar problems, however, can arise in the absence of a fund either present or potential.
A negative or mandatory injunction secured by one of a numerous class may disable the oppos-
ing party from performing claimed duties toward the other members of the class or materially
affect his ability to do so." 39 F.R.D. 69, 101-02 (1966) (Advisory Committee's Note to new
Rule 23(b)(l)(B) ).
The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules was appointed in 1960 by Chief Justice Warren and
charged with advising the Judicial Conference of the United States concerning the need for
revision of the Federal Rules. Announcement of the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme
Court, reproduced in 1966 FEDERAL PROCEDURE vii-ix (West 1966). The Committee's
recommendations, including its explanatory notes, were approved by the United States Supreme
Court and transmitted to Congress under the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1964); 39
F.R.D. 69 (1966). The Advisory Committee's Notes, therefore, constitute highly significant
commentaries on the scope of the new rules.
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whole . ""' The Advisory Committee's Note confirms the impli-
tion of the text of the rule that a (b)(2) class action "does not extend
to cases in which the appropriate final relief relates exclusively or
predominantly to money damages." ' 5
A consumer class action under the Uniform Act can fall squarely
within the terms of new Rule 23(b)(2). A merchant who has
standardized his deceptive schemes attempts to mistreat groups of his
customers in the same way,"6 and the Uniform Act makes available
injunctive relief against such conduct. The attorneys' fees provision of
the Uniform Act does not preclude (b)(2) class action treatment
because the allowance of attorneys' fees is not automatic." 7
Furthermore, computation of the fees allowable to the attorneys for
the class representatives is not comparable to computation of the
individual damages of every member of the class. While the latter
computation can make class action treatment unmanageable,"" the
former computation is far simpler"9 and should not be considered to
bar (b)(2) class action treatment.
Finally, new Rule 23(b)(3) permits a class action where "the court
finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the
class predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members, and that a class action is superior to other available
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy."' 20
"' FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). New Rule 23(b)(2) is a response to the number of civil rights class
actions that have been filed in recent years. Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee:
1966 A mnendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 389
(1967). However, the Advisory Committee's Note states flatly that "Subdivision (b)(2) is not
limited to civil-rights eases." 39 F.R.D. 69, 102 (1966).
39 F.R.D. 69, 102 (1966).
See, e.g., People v. Glubo, 5 N.Y.2d 461, 158 N.E.2d 699, 186 N.Y.S.2d 26 (1959); Robnet
v. Miller, 105 Ohio App. 536, 152 N.E.2d 763 (1957).
". UNIFORMi AcT § 3(b). But see notes 53-57 supra and accompanying text.
"'See School Dist. v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 1001 (E.D. Pa. 1967);
Comment, Litigating the Antitrust Conspiracy Under Amended Rule 23: Siegel v. Chicken
Delight, Inc. and School District v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 54 VA. L. REV. 314, 318-20
(1968).
"I There has been extensive experience in computing attorneys' fees under § 4 of the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1963), which permits recovery of attorneys' fees by successful antitrust
treble-damage plaintiffs. Among the factors considered are time spent, skill and standing in the
Bar, customary charges for similar work, and whether the case was ordinary or extraordinary.
See generally Note, The Nature of a "Reasonable Attorney's Fee" in Private Antitrust
Litigation, 1966 WAsH. U.L.Q. 102. A number of other instances in which attorneys' fees are
recoverable are recorded in Stoebuck, Counsel Fees Included in Costs: A Logical Development,
38 U. COLO. L. REV. 202, 207-11 (1966).
"I FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
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These elements could be met by a consumer class action under the
Uniform Act. Whether a particular merchant is engaging in a
deceptive trade practice, whether consumers are likely to be damaged
by the deceptive trade practice, and whether the court should exercise
its discretion to grant an injunction and attorneys' fees are issues in
which many customers of the merchant could have a common inter-
est.'2 ' Moreover, where a deceptive trade practice injures enough con-
sumers to make a class action possible, such an action is generally
preferable to individual litigation as a technique for regulating the
practice. Indeed, as a practical matter, there may be no individual
litigation. The Uniform Act's omission of a damage remedy reduces
the likelihood that individual consumers will seek injunctive relief
without the cost-sharing advantages of a class action.' 22
It is not surprising that a consumer class action under the
Uniform Act might be treated as either a (b)(l), (b)(2), or (b)(3) class
action. Any scheme of classification involves line drawing and
occasional hard choices. Furthermore, the general requirements in
new Rule 23(a) that all class actions must involve common questions
of law or fact and that representatives of the class must have typical
claims or defenses'23 mean. that (b)(l) and (b)(2) class actions are, in
effect, special cases of (b)(3) common-question class actions.'24 Thus,
one might infer that the categorization of a class action under
a particular subsection of new Rule 23 is of little moment.
However, new Rule 23 indicates on its face that proper
classification is important. With respect to (b)(3) class actions alone,
new Rule 23(c)(2) requires the court to direct the best notice of the
action which is practicable, including individual notice to all absentees
12. Cf. Grand Rapids Furniture Co. v. Grand Rapids Furniture Co., 127 F.2d 245, 252 (7th
Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 771 (1944); California Apparel Creators v. Wieder, Inc., 162
F.2d 893, 902 (2d Cir.) (L. Hand, J., dissenting), cert. denied. 332 U.S. 816 (1947).
"I When an irate customer sued the Los Angeles Yellow Cab Company on behalf of himself
and all other customers who had been overcharged within the period of the statute of limitations,
the Supreme Court of California observed that without the class action the defendant probably
would never be made to answer for its alleged wrongs. Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695,
715, 433 P.2d 732, 746, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724, 738 (1967) (In Bank).
Policing of deceptive trade practices by the Federal Trade Commission and various state
consumer fraud bureaus is an alternative to a (b)(3) class action. However, this approach would
make relief dependent upon the ebb and flow of public budgets and staffs. Professor Starrs has
stated that "the courts could take judicial notice of the present inability of the F.T.C., consumer
fraud bureaus, and offices of the attorneys general of the various states to cope with the ever-
pyramiding evidence of fraud in more and more industries." Starrs, supra note 82, at 98.
2I FED. R. Ov. P. 23(a)(2), (3).
124 Note, Proposed Rule 23: Class Actions Reclassified, 51 'VA. L. REV. 629, 662 (1965).
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who can be identified with reasonable effort. 12 5 The notice must advise
each absentee that the court will exclude him from the class if he so
requests by a specified date, that absentees who do not request
exclusion will be bound by the judgment in the class action, and that
any absentee who does not request exclusion may enter an appearance
in the class action through his own counsel' 2 6 The res judicata effect
of a (b)(3) class action is, of course, impaired to the extent that the
members of the class respond to (c)(2) notice by excluding themselves
from the class. Furthermore, where a class is sizeable, the burden and
expense involved in (c)(2) notice may make a class action
impracticable.'"
Mandatory (c)(2) notice and the privilege of self-exclusion are not
made features of (b)(l) or (b)(2) class actions by new Rule 23. These
latter actions accordingly have the potential of being more effective
and less awkward than their (b)(3) counterparts.-" However, the
recent Second Circuit decision in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin 9
suggests that (b)(l) and (b)(2) class actions involve a notice
requirement which parallels that in (b)(3) class actions.
Eisen was a class action against the two major odd-lot dealers on
the New York Stock Exchange, and the Stock Exchange itself.'30
The complaint alleged that the defendant dealers had combined and
conspired to monopolize odd-lot trading and had fixed the odd-lot
commission differential at an excessive amount in violation of the
Sherman Antitrust Act.'3' The Stock Exchange was charged with
failure to protect odd-lot investors through the adoption of rules
"I FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c)(2). But see id. 23(d)(2) which authorizes a court to require notice to
non-party members of a class wherever this is necessary for the protection of the absentees or for
the fair conduct of the action.
,Id. 23(c)(2).
", Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 568-70 (2d Cir. 1968); School District v.
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 1001, 1004-05 (E.D. Pa. 1967). It is presently an
open question whether the court or the litigants should dispatch the notice. Compare Kaplan,
supra note 114, at 398 & n.157 with Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth Annual Judicial
Conference, Third Judicial Circuit of the United States, 42 F.R.D. 437, 565-66 (1966) (remarks
of Professor Charles Wright).
"IS Professor Wright has speculated, "I would guess that we will not see in the immediate
future very many actions which the court permits to be maintained as (b)(3) class actions
." Proceedings, supra note 127, at 567.
129 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968).
" "Odd-lot" stock exchange transactions involve units of less than 100 shares. They are
handled by special odd-lot dealers who buy and sell for their own accounts as principals. Id. at
559.
31 15 U.S.C. §§ I & 2 (1964).
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under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.32 The sole plaintiff, whose
actual damages were estimated to be $70,11 sought to recover
damages on behalf of himself and an estimated 3,750,000 other buyers
and sellers of odd-lots from 1960 to 1966.34 However, the trial court
dismissed the class action aspects of the case,3 ' maintaining that Mr.
Eisen had failed to demonstrate that questions common to the class
predominated over questions pertaining primarily to individual class
members and that he could adequately represent the interests of the
class. Three reasons were given for the latter holding: (1) Mr. Eisen
had not satisfied the court that his damage claims were typical of the
damage claims of the class; (2) Mr. Eisen's interest was so miniscule
as to preclude adequate representation of the class; and (3) Mr. Eisen
could not practicably give the (c)(2) notice that was required in a
(b)(3) class action.'36
Because the trial court's ruling would, for all practical purposes,
terminate Mr. Eisen's suit, the decision was held to be immediately
appealable.' 7 The Second Circuit, while agreeing that a (b)(3) class
action which required (c)(2) notice was involved,'39 reversed the
dismissal of the class action'39 and held that the trial judge had
misapplied new Rule 23. Initially, the Second Circuit found that the
class had a common interest-in the legality of the odd-lot differential
and that Mr. Eisen's claim involved this interest.'40 Moreover,
quantitative representation, in the sense of high percentage of the
members of a class joining in an action, was held not to be essential to
adequate representation of a class. In a noncollusive suit, one litigant
with competent counsel and typical claims was found prina facie able
to represent adequately a large class.' Finally, the appellate court
held that the feasibility of judicial administration, the mechanics of
(c)(2) notice, and the sufficiency of representation were not to be
determined summarily. The case was remanded for .an evidentiary
hearing on such issues, with or without discovery proceedings.'
,' Id. §§ 78f(b) & (d), 78s(a).
"3 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 564 n.8 (2d Cir. 1968).
"' The estimate was made by the defendants and not disputed by the plaintiff. Id. at 561-62.
-'41 F.R.D. 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
,3 Id. at 150-52.
'31370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1968).
13 391 F.2d 555, 564-65 (2d Cir. 1968).
"'Id. at 570.
0Id. at 561-62.
4' Id. at 562-63.
141 Id. at 563-70. Eisen, the first full-dress court of appeals analysis of new Rule 23, id. at 560,
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In addition to the holdings iegarding (b)(3) actions, Eisen contains
some significant dicta with respect to (b)(l) and (b)(2) class actions.
The plaintiff in Eisen argued that his suit could be considered a (b)(1)
or a (b)(2) class action as well as a (b)(3) class action and that notice
to the members of the class was not mandatory with respect to (b)(1)
or (b)(2) actions.'43 The Second Circuit dismissed the propriety of
(b)(1) or (b)(2) classification of the action but, nevertheless, went on
to deal with the notice issue. The court stated:
[W]e hold that notice is required as a matter of due process in all
representative actions, and 23(c)(2) merely requires a particularized
form of notice in 23(b)(3) actions. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank
and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S. Ct. 652, 94 L. Ed. 865 (1950).
Advisory Committee's Note at 107.' 44
This dictum is overbroad. The Mullane case held that "notice
reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an
opportunity to present their objections"'4 5 is an element of due process
only where due process requires that notice be given to persons whose
interests are affected by a judicial proceeding. 46 However, the
Supreme Court has never determined that due process requires that
notice of a class action be given to all of the members of the class. In
the leading case of Hansberry v. Lee, 47 the Court stressed adequacy of
representation by the class representatives, rather than the dispatch of
notice of the action to the members of the class, as the principal
requisite of due process.141
The emphasis on adequacy of representation in Hansberry makes
sense. As Professor Chafee pointed out years ago, notice does not
was decided by the prestigious Second Circuit. The case will assuredly be influential. See
Hohmann v. Packard Instruments Co., 399 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1968); Minnesota v. United
States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559 (D. Minn. 1968).
"' 391 F.2d at 564 (2d Cir. 1968).
I Id. at 564-65.
14 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
See id.; Fraser, Jurisdiction by Necessity-An Analysis of the Mullane'Case, 100 U. PA.
L. REV. 305, 316-19 (1951).
' 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
", "It is familiar doctrine'of the federal courts that members of a class not present as parties
to the litigation may be bound by the judgment where they are in fact adequately represented by
parties who are present . . . ." 311 U.S. at 42-43. The most recent Supreme Court case to
consider the question stresses the adequacy of representation aspect of Hansberry. See Ameri-
can Federation of Musicians v. Carroll, 391 U.S. 99, 103 n.4 (1968). Commentators taking the
position that notice is not an inflexible constitutional requirement of a binding class action
include: Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 275-77 (1950); N.Y. JUDICIAL COUNCIL 18TH
ANN. REP. 242-44 (1952); Note, Proposed Rule 23: Class Actions Reclassified, 51 VA. L. REv.
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necessarily notify. 9 As Hansberry implies, an identity of interests
between class representatives and the class represented can be more
productive of adequate representation than the dispatch of notice to
the class.'50 On the other hand, notice of a class action can help to
ensure adequate representation by providing an opportunity for the
class to register objections to the representation. 5 This latter type of
notice, however, would be a more flexible requirement than the
Mullane-type notice apparently contemplated by the Eisen dictum.
In some cases, the cohesiveness and internal communications
system of a class will render notice of an action superfluous as a test
for adequacy of representation."' For example, this will often be true
in civil rights class actions,'53 and in cases where the officers of an
unincorporated association, such as a labor union, sue or are sued in a
representative capacity. 5 ' Moreover, notice which is intended to test
the adequacy of representation would not have to be sent to all
members of the class in order to bind the class. If notice is sent to an
adequate number of randomly-selected class members, it is probable
that the response will be representative of the class as a whole.,
Conversely, if receipt of the Mullane type notice is a predicate to
being bound by the result of a class action, every known class member
must be sent individual notice in order for the judgment in the action
to preclude all further litigation.'56
Notwithstanding the Eisen dictum, the text and notes to new
Rule 23 are congruent with the view that the use of notice to test
adequacy of representation in (b)(l) and (b)(2) class actions is
discretionary and can be selective. New Rule 23(d) states:
629, 636-40 (1965). Contra, Keeffe, Levy & Donovan, Lee Defeats Ben Hur, 33 CORNELL L.Q.
327, 337-39 (1948); Note, Federal Class Actions: A Suggested Revision of Rule 23,46 COLUNI.
L. REV. 818, 833-36 (1946).
"' Z. CHAFEE, supra note 148, at 276-77.
150 See id.
... Kaplan, supra note 114, 379-80.
Id.; see 39 F.R.D. 69, 106 (1966) (Advisory Committee's Note to new Rule 23(d)(2)).
"'See Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ala. 1966), affd per curiani, 390 U.S. 333
(1968) (action for declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to a segregated penal system).
' American Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 44 F.R.D. 47 (N.D. Okla. 1968).
New Rule 23.2 deals separately with actions relating to unincorporated associations but
reiterates the essentials of new Rule 23, FED. R. Civ. P. 23.2.
"' Note, Binding Effect of Class Actions, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1064 (1954); cf. Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 318-19 (1950). Statistical sampling
techniques could prove useful on this score.
16 Cf Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). Mullane permits
notice by publication to persons who cannot be easily identified. Id. at 317-18.
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In the conduct of actions to which this rule applies, the court may
make appropriate orders:. . . (2) requiring, for the protection of the
members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action,
that notice be given in such manner as the court may direct to some or
all of the members of any step in the action, or of the proposed extent
of the judgment, or of the opportunity of members to signify whether
they consider the representation fair and adequate, to intervene and
present claims or defenses, or otherwise to come into the action.' 7
Although notice concerning adequacy of representation is
described as only one of several possible types of notice by the new
rule, all of the kinds of notice specified relate to adequacy of
representation and provide an opportunity to raise that issue.
Accordingly it is highly significant that the Advisory Committee's
Notes make clear that a trial judge has discretion with respect to
utilization of (d)(2) notice and that such notice is more pertinent to
(b)(3), than to (b)(l) or (b)(2) class actions.' 8
Therefore, it seems apparent that neither the Constitution nor new
Rule 23 itself require mandatory notice of pending (b)(1) and (b)(2)
class actions to all known members of the class. This is fortunate for,
where there is a large consumer class and the individual stakes are
relatively small, the expense of providing class-wide notice could
effectively preclude litigation.'59 Furthermore, many consumer class
actions may not require even selective notice to test adequacy of
representation. Substantial numbers of the consumer class may
belong to the same consumer cooperative or live in the same
neighborhood so that intra-group channels of communication can be
relied upon. Even in the absence of such modes of communication, a
defendant-merchant's conduct may be so opprobrious and the
consumer class' common interest in relief so clear that selective no-
tice can be safely dispensed without jeopardizing adequate repre-
sentation of individual consumer interests. 10 Dispensing with notice
15 39 F.R.D. 69, 97 (1966).
"S "Subdivision (d)(2) does not require notice at any stage, but rather calls attention to its
availability and invokes the court's discretion. In the degree that there is cohesiveness or unity in
the class and the representation is effective, the need for notice to the class will tend toward a
minimum. These indicators suggest that notice under subdivision (d)(2) may be particularly
useful and advisable in certain class actions maintained under subdivision (b)(3) . 39
F.R.D. at 106 (Advisory Committee's Note to new Rule 23(d)(2)')
'See Daar v. Yellow Cab. Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732; 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967) (In
Bank).
16°See Note, Proposed Rule 23: Class Acilons Reclassified, 51 'VA. L. REV. 629, 638-40
(1965).
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of an action does not mean that a resultant decree will never be
brought to the attention of a consumer class. The decree itself can
require that the defendant take reasonable steps to notify his
customers of a court-ordered change in marketing methods. 6'
When the Eisen dictum concerning notice requirements in (b)(l)
and (b)(2) class actions is put into perspective, it is clear that the (b)(l)
and (b)(2) class actions are less cumbersome and expensive than (b)(3)
class actions. Mandatory notice to the entire class is required in (b)(3)
class actions alone.'6 2 Consequently, the determination as to whether a
consumer class action is being maintained under subsection (b)(l),
(b)(2), or (b)(3) takes on increased significance. The problem of
classification is naturally complicated by the fact that a consumer
class action can satisfy the criteria of all three subsections.
A similar classification problem was discussed in Van Gelnert v.
Boeing Co., 3 an action by the holders of convertible debentures
against the issuer of the debentures. While recognizing that the action
technically qualified under the provisions of all three subsections, the
court declined to treat the suit as a 23(b)(3) action reasoning that "to
do so would defeat the very objectives intended to be achieved by
Rule 23(b)(1) and (2)."164
The Van Gemert court correctly concluded that a class ac-
tion maintainable as a (b)(1) or (b)(2) class action should not
ordinarily be treated as a (b)(3) class action and thus subject to the
(c)(2) self-exclusion procedure. The self-exclusion procedure was
primarily intended to accommodate a class member's non-
constitutional interest in pursuing individual rather than group
litigation where the reasons for class action treatment are not
compelling. Thus, the Advisory Committee's Note to new Rule
23(b)(3) describes (b)(3) class actions as involving situations in which
"class action treatment is not as clearly called for as in those
described above . ,,161 The text of the rule and Advisory
Committee's Note also indicate that the major factor behind the
provision for self-exclusion was concern for a class member's interest
in personally controlling his own lawsuit. 6
I6 Cf. Crossbow, Inc. v. Glovemakers, Inc., 265 F. Su.pp. 202 (N.D. III. 1967).
162 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
163 259 F. Supp. 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
36 Id. at 130.
165 39 F.R.D. 69, 102 (1966) (Advisory Committee's Note to New Rule 23(b)(3)).
166 New Rule 23(b)(3) requires a court to consider the following factors in determining whether
a (b)(3) class action is superior to other methods of resolving a controversy: "(A) the interest of
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Although Van Gemert evinces a sound principle, its precise
rationale is not pertinent to consumer class actions under the Uniform
Act. Consumers notified of a class action for an injunction are more
likely to remain apathetic than to demand either exclusion from, or
active inclusion in the lawsuit. 6 7 On the other hand, avoidance of
mandatory (c)(2) notice where it is unnecessary also justifies
preference for a (b)(1) or a (b)(2) classification. The expense, bother,
and potential use of the notice to engage in undesirable solicitation of
claims 6 ' justify dispensing with the notice requirement wherever
possible.
However, the court must take care that members of the class are
not prejudiced by (b)(1) or (b)(2) class-action characterization.
Prejudice can be avoided by invoking new Rule 23(c)(4)(A) which
permits a court to limit the scope of a class action to specific issues.'69
Thus, designation of a consumer class action under the Uniform Act
as a (b)(l) or a (b)(2) action should be accompanied by an exclusion
from the class action of issues concerning the contract or tort damage
liability of the defendant-merchant to individual members of the
consumer class. Ascertaining the existence and amount of this
damage liability requires a painstaking evaluation of individual
transactions which is not requisite to establishing a violation of the
Uniform Act. Moreover, in order to ensure adequate representation,
members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions;
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or
against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation
of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the
management of a class action." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). See also 39 F.R.D. 69, 103-04 (1966)
(Advisory Committee's Notes to New Rule 23(b)(3) and 23(c)(2)). A California State Bar
Association Committee has maintained that the self-exclusion provision does not adequately
safeguard the interest in individual control of litigation. Report of the Carlifornia State Bar
Committee on Federal Courts, 37 F.R.D. 75, 76-77, 81-82 (1965). On the other hand several
commentators have argued that the new rule errs in not placing limitations upon the privilege of
self-exclusion. Note, Revised Federal Rule 23, Class Actions: Surviving Difficulties and New
Problems Require Further Amendment, 52 MINN. L. REV. 509, 524-27 (1967); Note, Proposed
Rule 23: Class Actions Reclassified, 51 'VA. L. REV. 629, 652-55 (1965).
" New Rule 23(c)(2) provides that silence following dispatch of (c)(2) notice results in
inclusion in the class action rather than exclusion from the class action. This equation of silence
with consent was made in recognition of the general apathy of "small guys" insofar as litigation
is concerned. Frankel, A mended Rule 23 Fromh a Judge's Point of View, 32 ANTITRUST L.J. 295,
299-300 (1966); Kaplan, supra note 114, at 397-98.
16' The Advisory Committee's Note warns against this possible misuse of notice. 39 F.R.D.
69, 107 (1966) (Advisory Committee's Note to New Rule 23(d) ). See also Comment, Recovery
of Damages in (lass Actions, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 768, 779-82 (1965).
"' "When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained as a class action with
respect to particular issues. .. . ." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)(A).
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members of a class who have substantial damage claims should be
entitled to notice of any class action which will adjudicate their
claims, and there should be a high degree of confidence in the class
representatives.10 The presence of substantial individual damage
claims also raises the possibility of a preference for individual
litigation. Where a court believes that a consumer class action
embracing contract and tort claims, as well as claims under the
Uniform Act, is superior to other methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of a controversy, (b)(3) classification is preferable unless
it is clear that only minimal damage claims are involved. The privilege
of self-exclusion and (c)(2) notice are most meaningful where
substantial damage claims are possible. The Advisory Committee's
Note, for example, suggests application of the (b)(3) procedure to
fraud cases involving damage claims.'7' Nonetheless, there will be
many instances in which (b)(3) classification can be avoided under
new Rule 23 through limitation of a class action to a claim for
injunctive relief.
FORMER RULE 23
Because former Rule 23 has been incorporated into the procedure
of a number of states, analysis of the feasibility of bringing a
consumer class action under the Uniform Act cannot end with new
Rule 23. Precedents under former Rule 23 will continue to be given
weight in states with rules derived from the former federal rule.
Former Rule 23 initially sets forth the fundamental "large class"
and "adequate representation" prerequisites to a class action.' These
criteria have already been discussed in connection with new Rule 23.'"
However, it should be pointed out that Eisen's concept of adequate
representation is apt to be influential under the old rule as well as
under the new rule. 7 4
Former Rule 23 distinguished between true, hybrid, and spurious
class actions depending on whether the right sought to be enforced for
370 Cf. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
17 39 F.R.D. 69, 102-03 (1966) (Advisory Committee's Note to New Rule 23(b)(3)).
,"FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
'"See notes 90-95, 99-105 supra and accompanying text.
"The notion that qualitative representation was more important than quantitive
representation was recognized under former Rule 23. Compare Waybright v. Columbian Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 30 F. Supp. 885, 888 (W.D. Tenn. 1939), affdon other grounds, 122 F.2d 245 (6th
Cir. 1941) and 2 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF. FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 567
(C. Wright Rev. Ed. 196 1) with note 107 supra and accompanying text.
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or against the class was (1) joint, common, or secondary; (2) several,
where the claim might or did affect specific property; or (3) several,
where the claim involved a common question of law or fact and
common relief was sought.'7 The judgment in a true class action was
generally considered to bind all the members of the class, the
judgment in a hybrid class action to bind all the members of the class
with respect to the specific property at issue, and the judgment in a
spurious class action to bind those members of the class who were
parties to the action.'76
Insofar as consumers are concerned, the classification of a
consumer class action for an injunction makes little difference under
former Rule 23. There are several decisions which indicate that even
an injunction granted in a spurious class action can protect nonparty
members of the class,' and former Rule 23 does not require notice of
the initiation of any type of class action.' 8 However, it is
advantageous from a defendant-merchant's standpoint, especially
where he has a good defense, for a class action to be considered either
true or hybrid. Judgments in class actions falling within these cate-
gories bind the entire class and provide a res judicata defense to the
merchant in subsequent, duplicative litigation.'79
A practitioner of deceptive trade practices may take consumers'
money, but he does not ordinarily jeopardize consumers' interests in
the same specific property. Hence, a consumer class action under the
Uniform Act is not likely to be considered a "hybrid" class action.8 0
"I FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(l)-(3). The appellations derive from Professor Moore who played an
active part in the drafting of former Rule 23. 3A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.08-. 10 (2d
ed. 1968).
76 E.g., Dickinson v. Burnham, 197 F.2d 973, 978-79 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 875
(1952) (dictum); C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 271 (1963). These conclusions as to resjudicata
effect also derive from Professor Moore.
' E.g., Frasier v. Board of Trustees, 134 F. Supp. 589 (M.D.N.C. 1955), affd per curiam,
350 U.S. 979 (1956); National Hairdressers' and Cosmetologists' Association v. Philad Co., 41
F. Supp. 701 (D. Del. 1941), affdpercurianz, 129 F.2d 1020 (3d Cir. 1942); Developments in the
Law- Multipart), Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71 HARV. L. REv. 874, 935-36 (1958).
"'FED. R. Civ. P. 23. Rule 23(c) does require notice to the class of the dismissal or
compromise of a true class action.
3A J. MOORE, supra note 175, at 23.11. Section 3(b) of the Uniform Act provides an
additional deterrent to unnecessary suits. Section 3(b) allows the award of attorneys' fees to a
defendant where "the party complaining of a deceptive trade practice has brought an action
which he knew to be groundless." UNIFORMt ACT § 3(b)(l).
"I A hybrid class action exists where the right sought to be enforced for or against the class is
"several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of claims which do or may affect
specific property involved in the action ...." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).
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The choice is accordingly between treatment as a true class action, in
which the result would be res judicata with respect to the claims of the
entire class, and treatment as a spurious class action, in which the
result would be res judicata only as to the claims of the members of
the class who were parties to the action. The case of Grand Rapids
Furniture Co. v. Grand Rapids Furniture Co."' supports the true-
action classification.
In Grand Rapids, the Furniture Manufacturers Association of
Grand Rapids and twenty-four Grand Rapids furniture
manufacturers sued in federal court to enjoin a Chicago retailer and
its incorporators from using "Grand Rapids" as a trade name. The
theory of the complaint was that the defendants were deliberately
creating the false impression that they were affiliated with a Grand
Rapids furniture manufacturer and could offer bargain prices on
Grand Rapids furniture; whereas, in fact, the defendants sold inferior
furniture that was not manufactured in Grand Rapids.' 2 The trial
judge granted a preliminary injunction and the defendant-retailer
appealed on the ground that the plaintiffs' individual claims did not
exceed the court's jurisdictional amount. Hox ever, the Seventh
Circuit held that there was diversity jurisdiction because the plaintiffs'
claims could be aggregated in order to attain the jurisdictional
amount. The basis for aggregation was the nature of the claims:
In the instant case we have a common cause of action, based upon the
same acts of the defendants. The plaintiffs have an undivided interest,
though separable as between themselves, and the amount of their joint
claim will be the test of jurisdiction . . . . The relief demanded is
identical. If any one plaintiff should in a single suit recover on the
demand here made by it or him, that judgment would of itself
immediately furnish all the relief which the other plaintiffs are here
demanding for themselves, except as to the amount of damages. That
phase of this case is purely incidental, as all the appellees and the
appellant respectively aver and admit that each of the defendants is
financially irresponsible. 83
Grand Rapids suggests that a consumer .class action for an
injunction should be considered a true class action under former Rule
"1 127 F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1942). Grand Rapids technically involved voluntary multiplejoinder
of parties rather than a class action. However, its holding is also pertinent to class actions. The
Grand Rapids court itself commented: "True, the instant suit is not a class suit by





23. A true class action can exist where class members have
"common" as well as "joint" rights,"' and Grand Rapids recognizes
that persons likely to be damaged by deceptive practices have a
common interest in obtaining injunctive relief.'85 This is true whether
the persons suing are consumers or biisinessmen. Additional support
for a true-class-action categorization can be found in the holding of
Grand Rapids that the interests of the plaintiff-manufacturers were
sufficiently intertwined to permit aggregation of their claims for
jurisdictional purposes. In determining whether aggregation was
permissible when former Rule 23 was in force, the federal courts
utilized the distinctions between true, hybrid, and spurious class
actions in construing their jurisdictional statutes, and only allowed
aggregation where the interests of the class were joint or common
rather than several.'86 Finally, new Rule 23 permits a class action for
an injunction to be treated as a binding class action,'"7 one of the
principal consequences of a true-class-action categorization.'88
Pursuant to the Grand Rapids principle, a consumer class action
for an injunction can be considered a true class action under former
Rule 23. However, as under new Rule 23, attention must be given to
the interests of consumers who can claim substantial contract or tort
damages for the conduct which violates the Uniform Act. The true
class action should ordinarily be confined to determining whether the
defendant has engaged in a deceptive trade practice and whether the
consumer-class is entitled to an injunction and an award of attorneys'
I" FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1), Appendix, 28 U.S.C. at 6101 (1964). What constitutes a
"common" right is to some extent a matter of conjecture. "Perhaps I am color-blind with
respect to class suits, but I often have as much perplexity in telling a 'common' right from a
'several' right as in deciding whether some ties and dresses are green or blue." Z. CHAFEE, supra
note 148, at 257.
"' See Grand Rapids Furniture Co. v. Grand Rapids Furniture Co., 127 F.2d 245, 252 (7th
Cir. f942); 2 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, supra note 174, § 562.1 at 267 & n. 24. See also
Pillsbury-Washburn Flour Mills Co. v. Eagle, 86 F. 608, 629, 630 (7th Cir. 1898), cert. denied,
173 U. S. 703 (1899).
"' Giesecke v. Denver Tramway Corp., 81 F. Supp. 957 (D. Del. 1949) (citing numerous
cases); I J. MOORE, supra note 175, at 0.97[5] (2d ed. 1964); Cohn, Problems in Establishing
Federal Jurisdiction Over an Unincorporated Labor Union, 47 GEO. L.J. 491, 525 (1959).
Grand Rapids did not apply these distinctions, because it was not a class action. However, the
description of the plaintiffs' interests by the Grand Rapids court is congruent with the indicia of
a true class action. See notes 175-76 supra and accompanying text.
" FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2), (c)(3).
" The other major distinctions between true, hybrid, and spurious class actions related to
nuances of federal jurisdiction which are not material in state courts. See C. WRIGHT, supra note
176, at 271-72.
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fees.' 89 Substantial individual contract or tort damage claims should
either be excluded from the ambit of the class action or processed
concurrently following notice to consumers of the opportunity to
present their claims. In the event that a consumer class action is
confined to a claim for injunctive relief under the Uniform Act,
former Rule 23 does not require that notice be dispatched to the class
except in the event of compromise or dismissal of the class action. 9'
Nor does the Constitution require notice in the absence of a question
concerning the ability of the class representatives to represent the
class. "'
CONCLUSION
The Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act specifically
proscribes a number of widespread deceptive practices, such as bait
advertising, price misrepresentation, and covert substitution of
goods.' 92 Moreover, section 2(a)(12) contains a general prohibition of
"conduct which similarly creates a likelihood of confusion or of
misunderstanding,"' 9 which is a vehicle for the importation of
Federal Trade Commission precedents into the law of private
deceptive trade practices.' 4 The sweep of the Uniform Act accords
considerable significance to the issue of consumer standing to invoke
its remedies.' 9
The tenor of the proceedings of the Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws and the Official Prefatory Note to the Uniform Act, when
"I Although former Rule 23, unlike new Rule 23, did not explicitly authorize a limited class
action technique, a federal court had discretion to utilize this approach under former Rule 23.
Dole, The Emergence of Deceptive Advertising as a Group Tort: A Possible Consequence of the
1966 Federal Rule Amendment With Respect to Class Actions, 62 Nw. U.L. REV. 661, 696-97
(1967); Note, Federal Rules: Class Actions, 7 OKLA L. REV. 472, 474-76 (1954). See Jinks v.
Hodge, I I F.R.D. 346 (E.D. Tenn. 1951), a case under former Rule 23 in which a federal district
judge seemed to consider a class action to be a true class action solely with respect to the demand
for an injunction.
110 Former Rule 23 required notice of compromise or dismissal only with respect to true class
actions. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(c).
See notes 148-61 supra and accompanying text.
192 UNIFORM ACT §§ 2(a)(1), (9), (10), and (II). See D. CAPLOVITz, THE POOR PAY MORE,
ch. 10 (1967) concerning the prevalence of these deceptive practices.
.. UNIFORM ACT § 2(a)(12).
'14 Dole, The Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act: Another Step Toward a National Laiv
of Unfair Trade Practices, 51 MINN. L. REv. 1005, 1038-41 (1967); cf. People v. National
Research Co., 201 Cal. App. 2d 765, 20 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1962).
"I' This is especially true in view of the deterrent effect of consumer-initiated litigation. Cf.
NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LAW AND POVERTY, CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 12-14
(Washington, D.C., June 23-25, 1965) (remarks of Professor Allison Dunham).
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linked with the interest that consumers can have in continuing to deal
with a merchant who has committed deceptive trade practices,
support the conclusion that a consumer can be sufficiently "likely to
be damaged" by a deceptive trade practice to have standing to sue un-
der the Uniform Act. This individual consumer standing in turn pro-
vides the underpinning for consumer class actions that constitute an
important mechanism for the suppression of widespread and syste-
matic consumer deception.

